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Comments
NLRA Preemption Put Simply:
Livadas v. Bradshaw
INTRODUCTION
During its last term, the United States Supreme Court once
again took the opportunity to examine the extent to which state
law is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (the
"NLRA" or the "Act")' in Livadas v. Bradshaw.2 Contrary to the
criticisms mounted by commentators such as National Labor
Relations Chairman William B. Gould, IV,' to the effect that the
current makeup of the Court is somehow politically driven to
deprive employees of state-conferred protections,4 in Livadas, a
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988).
2. 114 S. Ct. 2068 (1994).
3. Chairman Gould was appointed by President Clinton. Carl T. Hall,
Clinton's Choice to Head NLRB, S.F. CHRON., June 29, 1993, at C1.
4. See text accompanying notes 115-17. Others have criticized the Court on
related topics. See, e.g., Herbert N. Bernhardt, Affirmative Action in Employment:
Considering Group Interests While Protecting Individual Rights, 23 STETSON L. REV.
11, 12 n.5 ("Despite the increasingly conservative membership of the U.S. Supreme
Court, employers, under pressure from the U.S. Department of Labor, are moving in
the direction of utilizing affirmative action for the higher executive positions where
women and minorities have made less of an impact thus far."); Michael K. Braswell
at al., Affirmative Action: An Assessment of its Continuing Role in Employment Dis-
crimination, 57 ALB. L. REV. 365, 365 (1993) (stating that, "the conservative majority
of the U.S. Supreme Court appears to be on a course to limit affirmative action as
a component of antidiscrimination policy"); KG. Jan Pillai, Affirmative Action: In
Search of a National Policy, 2 TEMP. POL. & CIrV. RTs. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1992)
(discussing how the "successive appointment of several conservative Justices by Pres-
idents Ronald Reagan and George Bush," have marked an "intense and divisive
political debate over the fairness of affirmative action," which will only be made
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unanimous Court in a single opinion by Justice Souter, applied
simple and sound preemption jurisprudence to protect state-con-
ferred employee benefits.
What commentators like Chairman Gould neglect in their zeal
to slap the current composition of the Rehnquist Court with a
conservative label, is that not every Supreme Court opinion is
an expression of a political agenda. For example, in Livadas,
none of the justices even saw the need to clarify their particular
position on the political continuum with a concurring opinion.
Preemption doctrine is not the talisman of a conservative
Court bent on slashing state-conferred employee benefits and
protections that some commentators make it out to be. The folly
of this thesis is reflected in Livadas. When presented with the
opportunity to preempt California Labor Code provisions grant-
ing protections to terminated employees and providing penalties
against employers for violation of those protections, the Court
instead preempted the California Labor Commissioner's policy of
refusing to enforce those protections when the terminated em-
ployee happened to be covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment with an arbitration clause.'
While law professors and other commentators typically predict
the outcome of Supreme Court cases simply by considering the
political label of each justice and counting how the votes should
fall out with respect to a particular issue, sometimes perhaps
the Court just makes a decision based on sound jurisprudence.
The point is that this sort of "vote-counting," based on political
labels, breeds a kind of cynicism toward the Court which affects
not only law students, but lay persons as well. Breeding this
excessive entanglement of politics and the judicial function is
perhaps the kind of notion that someone like Learned Hand, the
greatest judge never appointed to the Court, would have frowned
upon.' In Livadas, the Supreme Court countered the "vote coun-
ters" by applying a simple preemption doctrine flowing directly
"worse for the proponents of affirmative action" by the appointment of Justices
Souter and Thomas); Amy R. Tabor, Civil Rights in the '90s: The Supreme Court
Overruled, 41 R.I. B.J. 21, 21 (1993) (indicating that "[djuring its 1989 term, the
U.S. Supreme Court, with its new, more conservative majority, issued a series of
decisions which made it much more difficult for minorities and women to challenge
discriminatory employment practices."); Debra L. Willen, Now States Act as Champi-
ons for Religion, NAT'L L.J., March 2, 1992, at 15 (stating that "[als the conservative
appointees of President Reagan and Bush solidify their control over the Supreme
Court, individuals seeking protection for civil liberties have begun to turn increasing-
ly to other forums"). *
5. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2071.
6. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 459
(1994) ("For Hand, excessively politicized judging remained a central evil.").
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from the Supremacy Clause.
NLRA PREEMPTION FROM AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The doctrine of federal preemption of state law arises from the
Supreme Court's long-standing interpretation of the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.' For example, in Nash
v. Florida Industrial Commission,' the Court held that the
NLRA preempted a state statute which terminated the
petitioner's unemployment compensation benefits because she
had filed an unfair labor practice charge.'" The Court plainly
stated that "[i]n holding that this Florida law as applied in this
case conflicts with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution we
but follow the unbroken rule that has come down through the
years."" In so holding, the Court concluded by summarily cit-
ing to line of cases"2 not specifically resting on the Supremacy
Clause, but nevertheless providing precedential authority, flow-
ing from McCulloch v. Maryland,3 through Davis v. Elmira
Savings Bank, 4 to Hill v. Florida.5
Generally, the Supreme Court has developed preemption doc-
trine according to two theories; federal preemption occurs: (1)
when an act of Congress is in "actual conflict" with a state law,
or (2) when there is no clear conflict between state and federal
law, but Congress has passed legislation intending to "occupy
the field." 8
7. For a more lengthy and detailed discussion of the historical development
of NLRA preemption, see 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1654-1728 (Patrick Hardin
ed., 3d ed. 1992), upon which much of this section is based.
8. The Supremacy Clause provides that "the laws of the United States shall
be the supreme law of the land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also WILLIAM B.
GOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAw 32 (3d ed. 1993) ("'The courts have
fashioned a doctrine of preemption that is based on the Supremacy Clause and the
Commerce Clause.").
9. 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
10. Nash, 389 U.S. at 236-37.
11. Id. at 239-40.
12. Id. at 240.
13. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (not specifically citing the Supremacy
Clause, but indicating that because of "the supremacy which the constitution has
declared," the state of Maryland -had no power "to retard, impede, burden, or in any
manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to
carry into execution the powers vested in the general government").
14. 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896) (not specifically citing the Supremacy Clause, but
indicating that where a New York banking statute and a Federal statute "cover
exactly the same subject-matter," the "lsw of New York is from the nature of things
inoperative and void as against the dominant authority of the Federal statute").
15. 325 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1945) (holding that a Florida law which placed cer-
tain requirements on obtaining a license to act as a "business agent" to a labor
union, was not "repugnant to the [NLRAI."); See also text accompanying notes 22-23.
16. See Stephen I. Locke, Fine Tuning Preemption or Rewriting the Market
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These two theories of preemption have held true in the Su-
preme Court's analysis of the more limited area of federal pre-
emption of state law caused by the National Labor Relations
Act. Despite the clearly established supremacy of federal law,
Congress left the matter of labor relations regulation nearly
entirely to the states until the 1930's."7 In 1935, acting under
the auspices of the Commerce Clause 8 power, Congress adopt-
ed the NLRA and assumed federal control over a broad and
unclearly defined body of law. 9 Almost immediately the ten-
sion between this new federal law and the substantial body of
state law regulating the same field manifested itself in cases
such as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp." In Jones &
Laughlin Steel, the Court upheld Congressional power, based on
the authority of the Commerce Clause and as delineated in the
NLRA, to provide for the right to organize as a union and to
choose a representative for collective bargaining.
2'
One of the earliest significant decisions considering the scope
of NLRA preemption was Hill v. Florida.2 In Hill, the Court
held a Florida law, placing restrictions on who could fill the role
of "business agent" to a labor union, preempted by the NLRA on
the theory that such restrictions conflicted with the NLRA Sec-
tion 7 right of employees to select their bargaining representa-
tives." Other early cases indicated the following: (1) Where
there was a potential for conflict between state law and the
NLRA, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board")
had primary jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.' (2) In some
areas, even though a potential conflict existed, states Could per-
missibly regulate matters of intense local concern." (3) States
Participant Exception?, 45 LAE. L.J. 3, 5 (1994).
17. Locke, cited at note 16, at 3.
18. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
19. See National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988)).
20. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
21. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 43 (stating "we have no doubt that
Congress had constitutional authority to safeguard the right of respondent's employ-
ees to self-organization and freedom of choice of representatives for collective bar-
gaining").
22. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
23. Id. at 544 (Stone, C.J., concurring). The pertinent language of Section 7
provides that, "[elmployees shall have the right . . . to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
24. See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) (holding that
a Pennsylvania state court could not issue an injunction pursuant to the Pennsylva-
nia Labor Relations Act, because the NLRB also could have sought an injunction in
federal court while the petitioners's grievance was being considered).
25. See, e.g., Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656
Vol. 33:887890
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could also regulate in areas which were of only peripheral con-
cern under the NLRA (usually relating to internal union mat-
ters).2" (4) But states could not regulate certain .areas, even
where the NLRB had never exercised the full extent of its possi-
ble jurisdiction.27
Essentially though, NLRA preemption doctrine has adhered to
the two basic theories mentioned above, the "actual conflict" and
"intent to occupy the field" notions of preemption. For example,
the decision forming the cornerstone of the Court's NLRA pre-
emption doctrine is San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon ("Garmon H")." - The Garmon II rationale is said to be
analogous to the "actual conflict" theory of general federal pre-
emption."
In Garmon II, the NLRB declined to exercise jurisdiction
when the employer had filed a petition requesting that the
NLRB resolve the question of the employees' proper representa-
tive.3" The petition had been filed during the course of peaceful
picketing aimed at forcing the employer to sign a union shop
provision into the labor contract.3 The California Supreme
Court sustained the holding of the California Superior Court
which enjoined two separate unions from picketing until one
union had been clearly established as the proper bargaining
representative.32 The California state courts reasoned that be-
(1965) (holding that the state court properly exercised jurisdiction over a common
law tort action for damages resulting from union conduct which would also have
constituted an unfair labor practice); United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S.
634 (1958) (holding that the state court properly exercised jurisdiction over an
employee's action against a union for malicious interference with his occupation
when the union's conduct would have also constituted an unfair labor practice).
26. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 621
(1958) (finding that the "potential conflict [between state court and NLRB jurisdic-
tion] is too contingent, too remotely related to the public interest expressed in the 0
Act, to justify depriving state courts of jurisdiction").
27. See, e.g., San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959). See also notes 26 to 58 and accompanying text discussing the case in detail.
28. 359 U.S. 236 (1959) [hereinafter Garman Ill. See also Walter E. Oberer,
The Regulation of Union Economic Power, in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY 270, 283
(Charles J. Morris ed., 1987). Professor Oberer has written:
The federal preemption doctrine, brought to peak fruition in Garmon, is itself
an important aspect of the regulation of union economic power under the
American scheme. That doctrine, at its Garmon peak, grants to the Board the
exclusive primary jurisdiction for the adjudication of the issue of whether the
subject union activity is either protected or prohibited under the Act, and, if
prohibited, the remedy to be provided.
Id. (emphasis added).
29. See Locke, cited at note 16, at 5.
30. Garman I, 359 U.S. at 238.
31. Id. at 237.
32. Id. at 237-38.
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cause the NLRB had declined to exercise jurisdiction over the
matter, jurisdiction resided properly in the state courts.33 The
state courts even went so far as to hold one union liable for an
unfair labor practice under Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.'
Certiorari was granted, 5 and in the Court's first opinion in
the Garmon matter it held that the refusal of the NLRB to exer-
cise jurisdiction did not automatically vest the state courts with
jurisdiction over activities they would otherwise be preempted
from adjudicating.36 Garmon I was issued simultaneously with
and controlled by the rationale provided in Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Board,37 and Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn
Meats, Inc.'s All three opinions were authored by Chief Justice
Warren and rested on the language of the proviso to Section
10(a) of the Act,"9 which was added to the Act as part of the
Taft-Hartley amendments.'
On remand, the California Supreme Court set aside the in-
junction, but allowed an earlier damage award to stand based on
the violation of state law amounting to a state law-based unfair
labor practice.4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for a
33. Id. at 238.
34. Id. Section 8(b)(2) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents - to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employ-
ee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or
terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues
and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retain-
ing membership.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1988).
35. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 351 U.S. 923 (1956).
36. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 29 (1957)
[hereinafter Garmon 1]. See also Garmon II, 359 U.S. at 238.
37. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
38. 353 U.S. 20 (1957). See also Garmon II, 359 U.S. at 238.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988). Section 10(a) provides:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any per-
son from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting
commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment
or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or
otherwise: Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any
agency of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any
cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and
transportation except where predominantly local in character) even though such
cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the
State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by
such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act or has
received a construction inconsistent therewith.
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (emphasis added).
40. See Guss, 353 U.S. at 7.
41. Garmon II, 359 U.S. at 239.
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second time in the case,42 this time to consider the issue of
"whether the California court had jurisdiction to award damages
arising out of peaceful union activity which it could not en-
join."'
In this second Garmon opinion, the Court acknowledged that
it had in the past attempted to delineate the extent to which
state regulation must yield to superior federal authority." In
reviewing these past opinions, the Court stressed that:
[Tihe unifying consideration of our decisions has been regard to the fact
that Congress has entrusted administration of the labor policy for the
Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own proce-
dures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative expe-
rience.45
The Court specifically reflected back to its decision in Interna-
tional Association of Machinists v. Gonzales' and its indication
that the states could permissibly regulate matters of "merely
peripheral concern" to federal labor relations policy.47 The Court
also looked to the reasoning of United Automobile Workers v.
Russell," which allowed for state regulation in the absence of
specific Congressional action, over "conduct [which] touched in-
terests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility."
49
The Court finally held that the California state courts lacked
jurisdiction because the activity in question was "arguably within
the compass of Section 7 or Section 8 of the Act."' Thus, it was
exclusively within the domain of the NLRB to determine the
status of the conduct which the state courts sought to remedy.'
In modern terms, Garmon holds state action preempted when
it regulates conduct which is "arguably protected" or "arguably
prohibited" by the NLRA.52 This standard has been construed to
fit into the "actual conflict" standard of general preemption theo-
ry,5 and is said to be "based predominantly on the primary ju-
42. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 357 U.S. 925 (1958).
43. Garmon 11, 359 U.S. at 239.
44. Id. at 241.
45. Id. at 242.
46. 356 U.S. 617 (1958). See also note 26.
47. Garmon I1, 359 U.S. at 243-44 (citing International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958)). See also text accompanying note 26.
48. 356 U.S. 634 (1958). See also note 25.
49. Garmon 11, 359 U.S. at 244 (citing United Automobile Workers v. Russell,
356 U.S. 634 (1958)).
50. Garmon II, 359 U.S. at 246.
51. Id.




risdiction of the [Board]."'
The theory of Congressional "intent to occupy the field" is also
exhibited in the area of NLRA preemption and manifested in
what is sometimes called the Machinists doctrine.' In Lodge 76
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n,5 the employer filed an unfair labor practice charge
under Section 8(a)(3)67 when the union ordered employees not to
work overtime during a dispute over the hourly length of the
work week.58 The NLRB dismissed the charge, but the employer
had also filed with the state employment relations commission.59
The state commission adopted its examiner's finding that the
refusal to work overtime was neither conduct arguably protected
by Section 7 nor conduct arguably prohibited by Section 8, so
that the state commission's jurisdiction was not preempted.6
The highest court of the state then affirmed the state
commission's order directing the union to cease from instructing
its employees to refuse to work overtime."' The Supreme Court
granted certiorari62 on the issue of whether federal labor policy
preempted the state commission's authority to issue such an
order when the union's objective was to place economic pressure
on the employer."
The Court reviewed the line of NLRA preemption cases culmi-
nating in Garmon II, 4 and then turned to a second line of cases
which focused upon whether Congress intended that the conduct
in question be left unregulated and controlled only "by the free
play of economic forces."65 The Court indicated that it had recog-
nized in the past that Congress may have intended certain activi-
ties to be "unrestricted by any governmental power to regu-
late."66 Thus, under this broad rationale, the Court indicated a
54. Lodge 76 Intl Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 138 (1976).
55. See Locke, cited at note 16, at 6.
56. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
58. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 133-35.
59. Id. at 135.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 136.
62. Lodge 76 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 423 U.S. 890 (1975).
63. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 133.
64. Id. at 138-39.
65. Id. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
66. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 141 (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S.
477, 488-89 (1960) (alteration in original)). The Court's reasoning may he better re-
flected in its entirety as it stated that it had:
[Riecognized that a particular activity might be "protected" by federal law not
Vol. 33:887
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deference towards preemption when Congress intended to occupy
the field - not by regulating the entire field, but by an intent to
leave the area completely regulation-free, being only "controlled
by the free play of economic forces." 7
To broadly but succinctly summarize, today the NLRA will
preempt state law either when the conduct in question is "argu-
ably protected" by Section 7 or "arguably prohibited" by Section
8, or when Congress has intended to leave the field entirely regu-
lation-free, allowing for the unrestricted free play of economic
forces.' These theories of preemption played out interestingly in
Livadas.
LIvADAS V. BRADSHAW
In Livadas v. Bradshaw," Karen Livadas was employed by a
Safeway supermarket in Vallejo, California as a grocery clerk
until her termination on January 2, 1990.70 Upon being notified
of her discharge, Livadas requested immediate payment of all
earned wages pursuant to Section 201 of the California Labor
Code.7 Section 201 simply provides that upon discharge, a Cali-
fornia employee is entitled to all earned wages immediately.7"
But the Safeway store manager refused the request, indicating
that payroll records were not available at the store7" and citing
only when it fell within § 7, but also when it was an activity that Congress
intended to be "unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate" because
it was among the permissible "economic weapons in reserve ... actual ex-
ercise [of which] on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system
that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized."
Machinists, 427 U.S. at 141.
67. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S.
138, 144 (1971)).
68. Although this comment deals with the two major trends in preemption
theory, Stephen I. Locke has argued recently that the Supreme Court's NLRA pre-
emption decision immediately preceding Livadas, the opinion delivered by Justice
Blackmun for a unanimous Court in Building and Construction Trades Council u.
Associated Builders and Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., indicates a
new trend in preemption theory. See Building and Constr. Trades Council v. Associ-
ated Builders and Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1190
(1993); see also Locke, cited at note 16, at 12. Locke argues that the Court has
"extended the market participation exception to the dormant commerce clause doc-
trine to a situation where Congress has enacted legislation." Locke, cited at note 16,
at 12-13. However, Locke's argument is inapplicable to Livadas, and beyond the
scope of this discussion.
69. 114 S. Ct 2068 (1994).
70. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2071.
71. Id. at 2071-72.
72. Section 201 provides in relevant part, that "[ilf an employer discharges an
employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and pay-
able immediately." CAL. LAB. CODE § 201 (West 1989).
73. Livadas v. Aubry, 987 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd 114 S. Ct. 2068
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the company's practice of paying all wages by check from the
company's corporate payroll office.74 Three days later, on Janu-
ary 5, Livadas received a check for her wages earned through the
date of her termination.75
On January 9, Livadas filed a claim against her former em-
ployer through the California Division of Labor Standards En-
forcement (the "DLSE").76 Livadas based her claim on Section
203 of the Labor Code which penalized an employer for willfully
failing to pay wages in accordance with Section 201; the penalty
being that an employee was to continue earning wages at the
same rate until actually paid or until an action for the withheld
wages was commenced.77 In her claim, Livadas did not question
her employer's calculation of the amount of wages owed, but only
sought the penalty for willfully withholding payment."
Livadas requested that the California Labor Commissioner
prosecute the claim on her behalf as permitted by Section 98.3,"
but by a form letter dated February 7, 1990, the DLSE declined
to do so. 0 The DLSE's reason for declining to pursue the claim
was not due to any weakness in the claim itself, nor to any fail-
ure of Livadas to qualify under Section 98.3, but rather only to
the fact that Safeway employees, including Livadas, were covered
by a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration
clause.81 Because Section 203 required wages to continue at the
(1994). The change in the parties' names from the Ninth Circuit's opinion to the
Supreme Court's opinion was due to the fact that Victoria Bradshaw succeeded
Lloyd Aubry as the California Labor Commissioner and was substituted as the re-
spondent before the Supreme Court in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 35.3.
Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2071 n.1.
74. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2072.
75. Id. at 2072.
76. Id.
77. Section 203 provides:
If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction,
in accordance with Sections 201, 201.5, and 202, any wages of an employee
who is discharged or who quits, the wages of such employee shall continue as
a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an
action therefor is commenced.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 203 (West 1989).
78. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2072 n.4.
79. Id. at 2072. Section 98.3(a) provides:
The Labor Commissioner may prosecute all actions for the collection of
wages, penalties, and demands of persons who in the judgment of the Labor
Commissioner are financially unable to employ counsel and the Labor Commis-
sioner believes have claims which are valid and enforceable.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.3(a) (West 1989).
80. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2072. The Labor Commissioner is the chief of the
DLSE and possesses all duties and powers of that office. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 79,
82(b) (West 1989).
81. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2072. The text of the DLSE's form letter embodied
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"same rate," in order for the Commissioner to pursue the claim, it
would be necessary to "look to the collective bargaining agree-
ment and 'apply' that agreement."82 It was the Commissioner's
position that such an "application" of a collective bargaining
agreement was prohibited by Labor Code Section 2298" and judi-
cial interpretations thereof, so that any action taken by the Com-
missioner in enforcing this particular claim under Section 203
would be impermissible. ' In fact, this construction of Sections
203 and 229 was simply "the Commissioner's policy of not enforc-
ing Section 203 claims for employees who worked under collective
bargaining agreements," as the Ninth Circuit termed it."5
Livadas brought suit in the United States District Court under
title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code" alleging that
the Commissioner's non-enforcement policy infringed upon her
the Commissioner's reasoning and read as follows:
It is our understanding that the employees working for Safeway are
covered by a collective bargaining agreement which contains an arbitration
clause. The provisions of Labor Code Section 229 preclude this Division from
adjudicating any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of any
collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause.
Labor Code Section 203 requires that the wages continue at the "same
rate" until paid. In order to establish what the "same rate" was, it is neces-
sary to look to the collective bargaining agreement and "apply" that agree-
ment. The courts have pointed out that such an application is exactly what
the provisions of Labor Code Section 229 prohibit.
Id.
82. Id.
83. Section 229 provides:
Actions to enforce the provisions of this article for the collection of due
and unpaid wages claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard
to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate. This section shall not
apply to claims involving any dispute concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of any collective bargaining agreement containing such an arbitration
agreement.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1989).
84. See note 80 for the Commissioner's position as illustrated in the form let-
ter to Livadas.
85. See Livadas, 987 F.2d at 555.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 has been interpreted as providing a
cause of action for the infringement of an employee's NLRA rights. See Livadas, 987
F.2d at 555. The Ninth Circuit addressed and affirmatively answered the issue of
whether Livadas could assert a cause of action under section 1983 by citing Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles. See Livadas, 987 F.2d at 555-57 (citing
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) [hereinafter
[Golden State III). In that case, the Supreme Court allowed. an employer to bring a
section 1983 action for a city's interference with the process of collective bargaining
by applying a two part test for section 1983 actionability: (1) "the plaintiff must as-
sert the violation of a federal right," and (2) "even when the plaintiff has asserted a
federal right, the defendant may show that Congress 'specifically foreclosed a remedy
under § 1983,' by providing a 'comprehensive enforcement mechanis[m] for protection
of a federal right.' " Golden State II, 493 U.S. at 106 (citations omitted).
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federally protected right to collectively bargain under Section 7 of
the NLRA.17 Livadas' theory was that the Commissioner's policy
of refusing to enforce Section 203 claims for employees covered by
collective bargaining agreements was in effect a penalty for exer-
cising her Section 7 statutory right.8
After granting a motion for reconsideration, the district court
granted summary judgment for Livadas and the Commissioner
appealed.9 A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed.9"
Despite recognizing that Livadas was entitled to a cause of
action under Section 1983 for deprivation of her right to bargain
collectively,9" the majority of the Ninth Circuit panel simply did
not believe that the Commissioner had actually deprived her of
that right.92 The majority concluded that the Commissioner's
action did not even implicate Livadas' federal rights,"' and in-
stead believed that Livadas' case boiled down to a "simple claim
that the Commissioner erroneously interpreted his own poli-
cy.... [Which] amounts only to a state law claim."9' The circuit
court asserted that this claim could not be "transformed into a
deprivation of a federal right."95 After the court of appeals de-
nied Livadas' petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing
en banc,9 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.97
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Souter indicated that
the questions of whether California Labor Code Section 229 was
constitutionally valid or whether the Commissioner's policy was a
proper interpretation of Section 229, were both irrelevant.9 8 In-
stead, as Judge Kozinski had argued in dissent below, the pre-
emption analysis in the case turned "on the actual content of [the
Commissioner's] policy and its real effect on federal rights.""
87. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2073. NLRA Section 7 provides that, "[elmployees
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (emphasis
added).
88. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2073.
89. Livadas, 987 F.2d at 555.
90. Id. at 560. Judge Kozinski was the sole dissenter. Id.
91. Id. at 557.
92. Id. at 558.
93. Id. at 558.
94. Livadas, 987 F.2d at 559.
95. Id. at 560.
96. Id. at 554. In keeping with his fervent dissent, Judge Kozinski voted affir-
matively on both the petition for rehearing and the suggestion for rehearing en
banc. Id.
97. Livadas v. Aubry, 114 S. Ct. 907 (1994).
98. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2076.
99. Id. (citing Livadas, 987 F.2d at 561 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
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The Supreme Court held the present case to be indistinguish-
able from Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission"' because the
policy in question amounted to a "state rule predicating benefits
on refraining from conduct protected by federal labor law."'
The policy left petitioner Livadas with the "unappetizing choice"
between remaining eligible to receive the benefits conferred un-
der California Labor Code Sections 201 and 203, or entering into
a collective bargaining agreement which contained an arbitration
clause." 2 Thus, the Court held that the Commissioner's policy
was preempted because this choice was not intended by Congress
and could not be "reconciled with a statutory scheme premised on
the centrality of the right to bargain collectively and the desir-
ability of resolving contract disputes through- arbitration."' 3
ANALYSIS
In defending against petitioner Livadas' claim, the
Commissioner's strongest argument was that the challenged
policy was not preempted, but instead was actually compelled by
the Court's preemption jurisprudence on Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (the "LMRA").0 4 The Commissioner
cited Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,"'0 for the notion that courts
should avoid adjudicating disputes between parties to collective
bargaining agreements which provide for arbitration.' The
Commissioner argued that because resolution of Livadas' claim
would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement
(in order to discern what the "same rate" of pay would be in com-
puting the penalty) which contained an arbitration clause, to
100. 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967) (holding a state policy that withheld unemploy-
ment benefits from any employee who had filed an unfair labor practice charge with
the NLRB was preempted).
101. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2074.
102. Id. at 2075. Justice Souter cited comparatively to Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Massachusetts, for the opposite but supportive proposition that a state
law was not preempted because it neither encouraged nor discouraged the process of
collective bargaining. Id. (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 755 (1985)).
103. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2075. The Court later asserted that, "the
Commissioner's unusual policy is irreconcilable with the structure and purpose of the
[NLRA]." Id. at 2082.
104. Id. at 2077 (stating that "[w]e begin with the most complete of the defens-
es mounted by the Commissioner, one that seems (or seemed until recently, at least)
to be at the heart of her position"). Section 301 of the LMRA provides that, "[sluits
for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
105. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
106. Livadas. 114 S.Ct. at 2077.
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resolve the claim would lead into an area which Congress intend-
ed to be governed by arbitrators. 7
But the Commissioner's interpretation of case law was off the
mark. As Justice Souter pointed out, the Court had made it clear
that when the meaning of a contract term does not form the basis
of the suit, the mere fact that a collective bargaining agreement
will have to be consulted during the course of state litigation did
not extinguish the state law-based claim.' In this case, the
need to refer to the collective bargaining agreement was irrel-
evant to the dispute (if one really existed) between Livadas and
her former employer."9 Therefore, even the Commissioner's
best argument failed.
But what was interesting about Livadas v. Bradshaw was how
the preemption analysis applied to the California Labor
Commissioner's policy itself. The Commissioner had argued that
the case fell within the Machinists doctrine,"' but the Court
found preemption of the policy to be compelled according to the
method of Nash, where the preemption rationale made a simple
and direct reference to the Supremacy Clause."' The reference
to Nash appears to represent a resort to "standard federal pre-
emption principles,""' much like those used in cases like Brown
v. Hotel Employees Local 54.13
In Brown, the Court contended that the primary jurisdiction
rationale of Garmon IH was inapplicable, and instead reasoned
that "the state law regulates conduct that is actually protected by
federal law," such that "pre-emption follows not as a matter of
protecting primary jurisdiction, but as a matter of substantive
right.""4 This was indeed similar to the situation presented in
Livadas: the Commissioner's policy affected conduct which was
actually protected by federal law - the right to be party to a
collective bargaining agreement. Thus, preemption of the policy
followed closely as a matter of substantive right; as a California
employee, Livadas possessed the statutory right to the Section
203 penalty for withheld wages. At the very least, she could not
be penalized for exercising her federal right.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2078 (citing Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S.
399, 413 n.12 (1988)).
109. Livadas, 114 S. Ct. at 2079.
110. Id. at 2075 n.l. See also notes 55-67 and accompanying text discussing
the Machinists' doctrine.
111. Id. at 2074. See also note 8 and accompanying text.
112. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1672 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed., 1992).
113. 468 U.S. 491 (1984).
114. Brown, 468 U.S. at 503.
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Regardless of the Court's rationale for holding the California
Labor Commissioner's anti-union employee policy preempted,
Livadas is probably most significant because it is a unanimous
decision upholding an individual's state statutorily provided right
through the use of federal preemption doctrine. This concept is
interesting because in recent years, commentators have encour-
aged the Court to retreat from the expansive preemption doctrine
having peaked with Garmon II, in an effort to secure greater
employee rights. The idea is that less federal preemption equals
greater employee rights through revitalization of state-conferred
benefits and protections.
For example, NLRB Chairman Gould has pointed out that
although there has been a recent trend among the states to enact
statutes to protect individual employees and to supplement feder-
al protection, this trend has encouraged employers to challenge
such statutes on preemption grounds." ' If the state statute is
preempted, the employer wins and the employee's rights are
limited.
Chairman Gould seems to attribute the existence of this trend
to an effort by the Supreme Court to expound a politically conser-
vative agenda. He has argued that the Republican appointments
to the Supreme Court have caused the Court to apply preemption
doctrine liberally to circumscribe the degree to which a state can
provide additional protections to employees. He has written:
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court, now populated by a solid Nixon-
Reagan-Bush majority, has become supportive of the doctrine of preemp-
tion when states attempt to protect the welfare of their employees in a
manner that is more ambitious than that provided for by the federal
government."'
Indeed, the Supreme Court has become supportive of the doctrine
of preemption. But respectfully, in his zeal to criticize the Court
as being politically slanted against labor organizations and indi-
vidual employee rights, Chairman Gould forgets that the Nixon-
Reagan-Bush appointees are also traditionally federalism or
state's rights advocates. " ' This author suggests that the cur-
115. See WILLIAM B. GOULD, IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 107 (1993).
116. GOULD, cited at note 115, at 107.
117. See, e.g., New York v. Sullivan, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). In Sullivan, Jus-
tice O'Connor, writing for a majority composed of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kenne-
dy, Souter, and Thomas, respectively, stated that, "Congress may not simply
'commandeelrl the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.' " Sullivan, 112 S. Ct. at 2420
(quoting Hodel v. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981)). Justice O'Connor also wrote that, "the Constitution has never been under-
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rent make-up of the Supreme Court is not out to deprive or even
to circumscribe the rights of individual employees through the
talisman of preemption, as Chairman Gould seems to indicate.
Rather, the Court recognizes the virtues of federalism and allows
states to provide for additional employee rights within the
bounds of federal law. The support for this argument is found in
Livadas, where a unanimous Court has effectively resorted to
sound and simple preemption jurisprudence to protect state-con-
ferred employee benefits.
CONCLUSION
Although critics may view every Supreme Court opinion with
an eye for discerning political motivation, perhaps they should
not be so quick to do so. Especially in the area of federal preemp-
tion of state law, and specifically preemption by the National
Labor Relations Act, there is room for apolitical consistency. In
recent times, it seems rare that a Supreme Court case is decided
by a unanimous court in a single opinion. But in Livadas v.
Bradshaw, the Court unanimously applied a simple yet authori-
tative preemption analysis to achieve the serendipitous result of
protecting an employee's state-conferred rights.
Kevin J. McKeon
stood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according
to Congress' instructions." Id. at 2421. See also Rebecca L. Hill, Note, California v.
F.E.R.C.: Federal Preemption of State Water Laws, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVrL. L. 261, 262 (1992) (stating that, "in recent years the Court has leaned more
and more toward respecting state's rights by narrowly construing federal statutory
language").
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